Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Concerned Parents of Step-Children, On Behalf of
their Members and All Others Similarly Situated,
and Janice Everill, Ellen Lehwalder and Linda Rey,
On Behalf of themselves and All Others Similarly
Situated v. Anthony Mitchell, Individually: and In
His Capacity as Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Social Services,: and Keith Oram,
Individually and In His Capacity as Director of the
office
of assistance Payments Administration : Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
ofPartRespondents
of the Law Commons
Utah Supreme Court

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
ROBERT B. HANSEN, PAUL M. TINKER, SHARON PEACOCK; Attorneys for Respondents
BRUCE PLENK; Attorney for Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Everill v. Mitchell, No. 16870 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2122

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------------------

~

CONCERNED PARENTS OF STEP. CHILDREN, on behalf of their
members and all others similarly situated, and JANICE
EVERILL, ELLEN LEHWALDER and
LINDA REY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. 16870

-vANTHONY MITCHELL, individually
and in his capacity as Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Social Services,
and KEITH ORAM, individually
and in his capacity as Director of the Off ice of Assistance Payments Administration,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal from a Decision of the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, the Honorable James s. Sawaya,
Presiding.
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
PAUL M. TINKER
SHARON PEACOCK
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondents
BRUCE PLENK
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
352 South Denver Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Fl LED
JUN

12 1980

Attorney
for Appellants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
...............................
.
..... _,. ......
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State
Library.
~---

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~·----

---·-·-·---~

Clor~. Su:m>ml Court. U+.:::1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------CONCERNED PARENTS OF STEPCHILDREN, on behalf of their
members and all others similarly situated, and JANICE
EVERILL, ELLEN LEHV\IALDER and
LINDA REY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. 16870

-v-

ANTHONY MITCHELL, individually
and in his capacity as Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Social Services,
and KEITH ORAM, individually
and in his capacity as Director of the Off ice of Assistance Payments Administration,
Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal from a Decision of the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, the Honorable James s. Sawaya,
Presiding.

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
PAUL M. TINKER
SHARON PEACOCK
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys .for Respondents
BRUCE PLENK
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
352 South Denver Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney

for

Appellants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I

IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE
STATE HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL REGULATIONS. - ------------- --- --------A.

B.

POINT II

THE TRI-PARTITE TEST IS NOT
A BASIS FOR STRIKING DOWN A
STATE STATUTE. -------------

2

3

THE UTAH AMENDED PLAN DOES
COMPLY WITH 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a) 10

RESPONDENTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY
COMPLIED WITH THE APPLICABLE
NOTICE AND FAIR HEARING REQUIREMENTS. - --- - ------ --- -- ------ ----

19

DEFENDANTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY
COMPLIED WITH ALL APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH RULEMAKING ACT. --------------------

25

THIS COURT LACKS THE POWER TO
COMPEL A STATE AGENCY TO FUND A
PROGRAM RETROACTIVELY. ---------

30

CONCLUSION -----------------------------------

33

POINT III

POINT IV

APPENDIX I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASES CITED

Archibald v. Whaland, 555 F.2d 1061 ,(1st Cir.
1977) -----------------------------~----------------- 6,7,8,10,
. 12, 13,14
Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F.Supp. 546
Curtis v. Page, No.

78~732

(E.D. Pa. 1978) ----- 22,23

(N.D. Fla.,

Apr~

13, 1978)

23

Kelley v. Iowa Department of Social Services, 197
N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1972) appeal dismissed 409 U.S.
9,10,13,
813 ------------------------------------------------ 14
·

iulUD:

Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) ------------------ 3,8,9,12,
16
Lovett v. U.S., 66 F.Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl. 1945) --------- 32
Turner v. Walsh, 535 F.Supp. 707

(W.D. Mo. 1977) ------ 23

Viverito v. Smith, 421 F.Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) --- 23

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS CITED
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 63-38-1 et seq. --------Section 63-38-1(2) --------------Sections 63-46-1 et seq. --------Section 63-46-5 -----------------Section 78-45-4.1 ---------------Section 78-45-4.2 ----------------

27,32
28
25
27
10,12
4

42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) --------------------------------- 15
§ 604(a) ------------------------------------ 17
§ 606(a) -~---------------------------------- 15
45 C.F.R § 205.lO(a)
§ 205 .10 (a)
§ 205.lO(a)
§ 233.90(a)

(4) (iii) -------------------------(5) ------------------------------(6) ----------------------------------------------------------------

19,21,24
2 0 I 2 2 I 2 3 21
21,22,23,2 1
r
5,6,8,10,.
14,15,16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
(ii)
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f

TABLE OF CONTENTS
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Bryce, The American Conunonwealth, 158

(1905) ---------- 31

Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 78 --------------------- 32
Senate Bill 54 ---------------------------------------- passim
Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1 --------------- 27,31
Article VI, Section 1(1) ----------- 27
Utah Support of Stepchildren Act ---------------------- passim
Volume II, Section 232, Financial Assistance
Regulations, Assistance Payments Administration ---- 20
Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
copyright 1976 ------------------------------------- 6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
(iii)
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------CONCERNED PARENTS OF STEPCHILDREN, on behalf of their
members and all others similarly situated, and JANICE
EVERILL, ELLEN LEHWALDER and
LINDA REY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 16870

-vANTHONY MITCHELL, individually
and in his capacity as Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Social Services,
and KEITH ORAM, individually
and in his capacity as Director
of the Office of Assistance
Payments Administration,
Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable James
S. Sawaya presiding.

Based on stipulated facts, the District

Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, denied
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and held that Defendants
had not violated state or federal statutes or regulations in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

terminating part of the state's welfare program.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents respectfully request this Court to
affirm the ruling of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents Bccept the Statement of Facts as set
forth by Appellants with two reservations:
1.

Federal regulations do not require that the

obligation imposed on stepparents be "identical" with that
imposed on natural parents, but rather that it be a law of
"general applicability which requires stepparents to support
stepchildren to the same extent that natural or adoptive
parents are required to support their children."

(Emphasis

supplied.)
2.

The United States Department of Health, Education

and Welfare has since receded from its objections to the Utah
policy change.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED ·THAT THE STATE HAS
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL
REGULATIONS.
Appellants argue that the state statute on stepparent
support, the support of stepchildren Act, fails to comply with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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federal regulations and is therefore invalid.

Because of

this alleged invalidity, plaintiffs claim that the act was
relied upon improperly to stop welfare payments to the
plaintiffs' families; as a result, plaintiffs continue, all
those whose welfare payments were terminated under the
statute should be retroactively awarded payment from the
time the funds were discontinued.
A.

THE TRI-PARTITE TEST IS NOT A BASIS
FOR STRIKING DOWN A STATE STATUTE.

In support of their argument, Concerned Parents of
Stepchildren (C.P.S.) rely heavily upon the

11

tri-partite test"

which is used by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (H.E.W.) to evaluate the support obligations of stepparents in state implementation plans under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.) program.
The so-called "tri-partite" test originated in
H.E.W.'s brief amicus curiae to the United States Supreme
Court in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552

(1970).

H.E.W.

urged that compliance with this test was essential for a
state to qualify for federal financial participation under
the AFDC program.
dated June 8, 1979,

As set out in H.E.W. letter to defendants
(Appendix 1 in Appellants' brief) the

test sets out three separate criteria which a stepparent's
support obligation must meet:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1.

A duty of general applicability;

2.

One which an obligor could be compelled
by court order to fulfill even after he
has deserted or abandoned the household;
and

3.

One which must exist regardless of whether
the children would otherwise receive AFDC
payments.

Appellants maintain that the Utah statute is invalid because
it fails to meet the second part of the three-pronged test,
that of

11

coextensiveness," and cite several differences

between support obligations of stepparents and natural or
adoptive parents in Utah to show that the support of stepchildren statute fails to meet H.E.W. regulations.
Of the five problem areas that appellants find in
the support of stepchildren statute, appellant's brief at
9 through 11, the second and third were not found to violate
the federal regulations by H.E.W. itself.

And yet, appellants

claim that great deference is due a federal agency in interpreting its own regulations, "unless there are compelling
indications that it is wrong," Appellants' Brief at 11.

The

second problem area cited by appellants is the difference in
ability to recover support obligations under Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-45-4.2.

Although in her letter of June 8, 1979,

the Regional Commissioner for H.E.W. disapproved of Section
78-45-4.2, this disapproval was withdrawn after further
consideration in the official letter of notice dated August
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
-4Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3, 1979,

(Appendix 2, Appellants' Brief).
In a letter to Respondent Anthony Mitchell dated

November 23, 1979,

(Attached as Appendix 1, hereto), the

Assistant Regional Commissioner for Family Assistance
explained:
In correspondence dated August 3, 1979,
the regional off ice had deleted previous
objections to that section and the present
position of the regional office remains
the same.
This is based on our analysis
which concluded that the stepparent's
right to reimbursement from a natural/
adoptive parent does not lessen his
obligation to support his stepchildren
as otherwise provided for under Utah
law.
The third difference between stepparent support
obligations and those of natural or adoptive parents claimed
by appellants as a violation of H.E.W. regulations, the liability
for children aged

18 to 21 when ordered by a court in a

divorce proceeding, Appellants' Brief at 10, was not cited
at all as a difficulty by H.E.W. after its careful scrutiny
of the Utah legislation.

Are appellants unwilling to give

to H.E.W. the deference which they urge this court to give?
Concerning the other objections to the Support of
Stepchildren Act, respondents submit that 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a)
does not require a "coextensive" obligation.
extensive" is not used in 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a).

The word "coThe federal

regulation requires only that the stepparent's duty of support
be "to the same extent" as that of a natural or adoptive
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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parent.
terms.

There is a significant difference between these
"Coextensive" means "having the same scope or

boundaries; occupying the same space or period of time."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, copyright
1976, at 439.

There is an apparent connotation of identical

time (duration) and space (limits).

Obviously the support

obligation of a stepparent cannot be identical either as to
time (duration) or space (scope) to that of a natural parent.
An obligation "to the same extent" however is a different

thing.

To the same extent means to the same degree or limit.

See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra at
805.

It is obvious that this expression must be applied in

the context of the particular situation involved and not as
an absolute standard.
This distinction is not just a play on words.

The

significance of such distinction was recognized in the case
of Archibald v. Whaland, 555 F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1977).
Appellants criticize the use of Archibald v.
Whaland, supra, first because it is "one of only two cases
ever decided that upheld a state procedure as consistent
with the requirements of 45 C.F.R. §233.90(a)."
Brief at 13.

Appellants'

It should hardly need pointing out that each

state is given considerable leeway in how it implements
the federal AFDC program.

The court decisions on whether

the particular state statutes comply with the federal statutes
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-6-may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

and regulations turn on the manner that the individual
states have chosen to implement the federal plan.

The number

of cases falling on either side of the question is therefore
irrelevant to this questioni the significant matter is
rather, whether the particular case is helpful in analyzing
the Utah statutes.
In their effort to discredit the use of this case,

t.

appellants misrepresent the issue, as "whether exclusion of
stepchildren from the New Hampshire criminal non-support

t.

statute violated the 'coextensiveness' test."

The court

itself stated that the fact that the criminal penalty could
not be applied to stepparents was not determinative; in the
court's words, "[t]he

more crucial difference in the analysis"

involved the statutes which imposed the legal obligation in
the first place - the Uniform Civil Liability for Support
Act, which was enforceable against both stepparents and
natural parents.

Archibald v. Whaland, 555 F.2d 1061 at

1066 (emphasis supplied).

That H.E.W. agreed with New

Hampshire that the obligations of stepparents and natural
parents were essentially similar is not a primary question:
we're dealing with two different offices of H.E.W., each
of whom makes its own determinations, and moreover, the
reason respondents rely on the case here is because of the
reasoning, which is sound, and the underlying similarities

s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in the facts between Utah and New Hampshire, which should
result in a similar determination in this case.

That H.E.W.

came to a different determination at a different time and a
different place is of little moment.
In Archlbald, the Circuit Court was reviewing a
district court determination that stepchildren were not
protected "to the same extent" as natural children because
stepparents were not covered by New Hampshire domestic
relations laws which require natural parents to continue the
support of their children after legal separation, pending
and after divorce.

The review court held that "to the same

extent" does not mean "identical and coextensive".

The

court stated:
Recalling our discussion of King v. Smith,
supra, and Lewis v. Martin, supra, we believe
the court's teaching in these cases to be that
the support function served by AFDC itself could
only be replaced by a breadwinner with the
"approximate" support obligation of a natural
parent. Were all of the obligations to be
identical and coextensive, the effect would
be a compulsory requirement on all states
participating in AFDC (and all states do
participate) to have civil support, criminal
support, and divorce and separation laws
treating natural, adoptive, and stepparents
equally in all respects. We can discern
no interest of national welfare policy that
requires such pervasive monitoring of state
domestic relations laws.
555 F.2d 1066.
In Lewis v. Martin, supra, the fountainhead case
in which 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a) was sustained by the Supreme
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Court, a similar "approximation" test was suggested.

Nothing

is said in Lewis v. Martin relating to an "identical" or
"coextensive" degree of support.

The court concluded that

it was reasonable for H.E.W. to require that the stepparent
support obligation be to the same extent as a natural or
adoptive parent and then stated:
Any lesser duty of support might merely
be a device for lowering welfare benefits
without guaranteeing that the child would
regularly receive the income on which the
reduction is based, that is to say, it
would not approximate the obligation to
support placed on and normally assumed
by natural or adoptive parents.
397 U.S. at page 567 (Emphasis added.)
Even assuming the word "coextenstive" is a legitimate
synonym for the expression "to the same extent," it is interesting
to note that at least one court has found said word to mean
something less than identical.

In the case of Kelley v. Iowa

Department of Social Services, 197 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1972),
the court held that it is immaterial that a stepparent may
have the power to leave the family and terminate his obligation
of support, and that so long as the stepparent has a support
obligation while living with the stepchild the law is of
general applicability and his obligation is conextensive with
the natural parent's obligation.

Id. at 199.

The "tri-partite" test was neither referred to by
the Supreme Court in the Lewis decision nor specifically
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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adopted

in that case.

At least two courts and perhaps the

United States Supreme Court by implication, have excised one
or more of the criteria.

See Kelley v. Iowa Department of

Social Services, supra, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 813, and
Archibald v. Whaland, supra.
In the letter to defendant Anthony Mitchell of
June 8, 1979, the Acting Regional Commissioner for the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare acknowledged
that the Department is considering whether to modify its
policy in relation to the treatment of stepparents but
"unless a decision to change the present policy is made,
which has not yet occurred, the Department is still following
the 'tri-partite' test."
Brief).

(See Appendix 1, Appellants'

To rule in favor of petitioners on the basis of

strict adherence to the "tri-partite" test, when the test
is neither statute nor regulation, and when it is under
review by H.E.W. itself, seems unfair and unjustified.
B.

THE UTAH AMENDED PLAN DOES COMPLY
WITH 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a).

Petitioners charge that respondents "concede that
the terms of Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-4.1 did not
meet the requirements of 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a)" because
respondents urged the Utah legislature to make certain changes
in the Support of Stepchildren Act.

Respondents do not and

have not conceded that the recently passed legislation violates
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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any federal law. In order to prevent the loss of vital
federal funding, without which the children in their care
might be seriously disadvantaged, respondents have suggested
certain changes to the legislature.

That action was taken

because of the continued disagreement between the Department
of Social Services and H.E.W. and the increasingly technical
criticism which the Utah Department of Social Services was
experiencing from the H.E.W. Regional Office.

That action

to insure the preservation of its programs cannot be
construed as an admission.
Appellants also state

that the "agency interpretation

of the Social Security Act and its own rules coincides with
the arguments of Appellants .... "

Appellants' Brief at 12.

Two instances have already been discussed herein where that
is not the case.

Appellants do not clearly delineate which

of the differences they note in stepparent versus natural or
adoptive parent support obligations under the Utah statutes
go to the general applicability and "coextensiveness" tests.
Respondents will therefore assume that appellants adopt the
analysis of H.E.W. and show why that analysis is incorrect.
45 C.F.R. 233.90(a) requires that a State plan under
Title IV-A of the Social Security Act must provide that determination of eligibility for assistance will be made only in
relation to a stepparent who is

(1) ceremonially married to the

child's natural or adoptive parent, and (2) legally obligated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to support the child under state law of general applicability
which requires the stepparents to support stepchildren to the
same extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to
support their children.

The Utah plan amendment utilized the

same language verbatim.

The issue is whether or not the

Utah State law is of general applicability.
The Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
Sections 78-45-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended 1979, included stepparent within the definition of
"parent" and defined "stepparent" as a person ceremonially
married to the child's natural or adoptive parent.

It also

provided that a stepparent shall have the same duty of support
as a natural or adoptive parent, provided that upon the
termination of the marriage or "in cases where there is a
filed pending divorce action with separation or a legal
separation" the support obligation will be as if the marriage
had never taken place.
The Supreme Court in Lewis v. Martin, supra, agreed
that it was reasonable to require the state law to be of
"general applicability" in order to provide a solid assumption
for estimating funds actually available to the child.

In

the Archibald case, supra, the court discusses the term in
the context of special exceptions or exclusions.

It states

that if the statute applies to all natural, adoptive and
stepparents, is not "tailored to welfare," and covers
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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irt

a ,

n

children of all ages, it is a state law of "general applicability," concluding that
We think that the requirement of
"general applicability" focuses on
arbitrary limitations which make it,,'.
clear that the duty of support is
defined not in terms of the stepparent
relationship, but primarily in terms
of welfare eligibility.
555 F.2d at 1065.
The Archibald case specifically separates the "general applicability" requirement from the "to the same extent" requirement
as phases one and two of its inquiry.

In other words, whether

the state law requires the stepparent to support the child to
the same extent as.the natural or adoptive parent does not
determine whether the statute has general applicability, and
is a separate concern.

The H.E.W. analysis has corruningled

these two considerations in the instant situation and concluded
that since in its opinion the stepparent does not have a
coextensive

duty with the parent, then the state law does

not have general applicability.

·In the Kelley case, supra,

the court had little difficulty in concluding that the law
was one of general applicability so long as the stepparent
has the same duty of support as the parent while living with
the stepchild.

197 N.W.2d at 199.

As the Utah statute

absolves the support obligation only when the stepparent has
both filed divorce and separated it would appear that the
Utah circumstance is the same as that involved in the Kelley
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
case.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated -13OCR, may contain errors.

our decision, a very small tail would indeed
be wagging a very large dog.
Unless absolutely
identical and coextensive support obligations
are envisaged by the regulation, this de minimis
descrepancy should not determine the issue of
compliance with 45 CFR 233.90(a).
Archibald, supra, at 1066.
The distinction is de minimis as a

p~actical

matter

for the following reasons:
When considering the allowance of stepparent income,
two separate aspects are involved:

(1) the eligibility of the

family group for AFDC and (2) the amount of the grant to be
received.

The child qualifies for assistance only if he

has

been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental
incapacity of a parent.

42 U.S.C. 606(a).

The amount of

assistance depends upon the income and resources of the child
or any other individual (including stepparents) living in
the same home as the child.

42 U.S.C. 602(a) (7).

Consideration

of stepparent income under 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a) becomes critical
therefore not so much in determining eligibility but in
determining amount of assistance.

It follows that the question

of "coextensiveness" of support obligation is really of little
practical importance since regardless of such test the actual
contribution of either parent or stepparent while living
with the child can be included in determining the amount of
assistance to be given.

An abstract concern as to the exact

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondents conclude, therefore, that since the Utah
statute applies to all stepparents, covers children of all
ages, and does not depend on welfare eligibility, the statute
is of general applicability.
er

The fact that the stepparent

may terminate his obligation by filing for divorce and separating
from his wife_ is, as stated in the Kelley case, inunaterial in

me,

the

relation to the question of general applicability.
Any post-separation distinction between the support
obligation of the stepparent and the parent is de minimis both

as

as to legal and practical consequences.
The distinction is legally de miriimis because it
really has no effect on the application of 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a).

:al

The Kelley case, supra, seems to say that any disparity
in support obligations between natural parent and stepparent

.ld

upon leaving the home is legally inconsequential.

In the

Archibald case, supra, the court says that even if the disparity

:ati~:

is not inconsequential, it is certainly irrelevant when it is

ical
considered that when a stepparent leaves the family, the AFDC
program becomes available.

The point is succinctly stated

tio~

tle

al...

by the Archibald case as follows:
We see no reason of welfare policy that would
make post-separation support obligations germane
to the question of compliance with 45 CFR 233.90
(a) which deals with the requirements to be met
if AFDC is not to be available ....
Nevertheless, if the differential in support
obligation of such limited scope were to control
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"coextensive" duration of the stepparents obligation is in
fact irrelevant, since once the stepparent leaves the home
his contribution is no longer pertinent in establishing or
in determining the amount of assistance.

Truly, the only

critical period as to the required similarity of the parent
and stepparent obligation under 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a),
particularly in relation to a "reasonable" "solid assumption"
of income as spoken of in the Lewis v. Martin case, supra,
such as would justify discontinuance of statewide stepchild
assistance program, is during the time the stepparent is in
the home.
In fact, from this standpoint in regard the amount
of assistance, it becomes clear that the precise proviso in
the Utah statute under attack is in reality a saving grace
of the Act.

If the stepparent's support obligation survives

his separation from the family then there may be a time, at
least pending new application, when the stepparent is in
fact making no contribution and the child in need

rec~ives

no assistance because the stepparent's contribution is assumed.
It should also be noted that the number of stepparents
who would fall in the tiny crack of stepparents who have "filed
for divorce with separation"

(the group being used by H.E.W.

to disqualify the State plan) would be a small fraction of
the stepparents involved in the stepchild assistance program.
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The post-separation distinction between parent and
stepparent as to support obligation in the state statute is
both legally, and as a ·practical matter, de minimis, and it
does not destroy the general applicability of the statute.
Even if this court

~hould

find that in some way

respondents erred in compliance with the relevant federal
1

il~

statutes or rules, the proper course for the court to take
is to leave the remedy to H.E.W.

42 U.S.C.

§

604(a)

provides:
§

604. Deviation from plan

(a} Stoppage of payments
In the case of any State plan for aid
and services to needy families with
children which has been approved by the
Secretary, if the Secretary, after
reasonable notice and opportunity for
hearing to the State agency administering
or supervising the administration of such
plan, finds(2) that in the administration of
the plan there is a failure to comply
substantially with any provision required by section 602(a) of this title
to be included in the plan;
the Secretary shall notify such State
agency that further payments will not
be made to the State (or in his discretion,
that payments will be limited to categories
under or parts of the State plan not
affected by such failure) until the Secretary is satisfied that such prohibited
requirement is no longer so imposed, and
that there is no longer any such failure
to comply.
Until he is so satisfied he
shall make no further payments to such
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State (or shall limit payments to
categories under or parts of the
State plan not affected by such
failure).
This is the proper remedy for the violations alleged
by appellants, and H.E.W. may be presumed to have satisfied
itself at this point that such sanctions are not necessary.
Appellants do not even assert now that the statute imposing
a duty of support on stepparents is unconstitutional.

They

do not~ nor can they, dispute the power of the Utah legi~lature
to impose a duty of support upon stepparents.

They merely

assert that the manner in which the duty was imposed did not
comply with certain technical requirements of the federal
government relating to the public assistance programs.

Indeed,

appellants ilo not appear to be in the narrow categories
potentially deprived of the benefits as a result of lack of
"coextensiveness."

Rather they merely object to the overall

result of the imposition of the duty upon stepparents.

They

have no valid claim to a remedy in this Court, and the matter
of failure to comply with H.E.W. regulations should be left
to H.E.W.
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POINT II
RESPONDENTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED
WITH THE APPLICABLE NOTICE AND FAIR HEARING
REQUIREMENTS.
The requirements for notice and hearing where state
agencies intend to discontinue or reduce family assistance
are laid out in four steps in 45 C.F.R. § 205.lO(a) (4) (iii):
When changes in either State or Federal
law require automatic grant adjustments
for classes of recipients, timely notice
of such grant adjustments shall be given
which shall be "adequate" if it includes
(1) a statement of the intended action,
lt

ll

:er

(2) the reasons for such intended action,
(3) a statement of the specific change
in law requiring such action and
(4) a statement of the circumstances
under which a hearing may be obtained
and assistance continued.
(Emphasis added, and numerals inserted for clarity.)
The Utah Assistance Payments Administration sent out
the following notice on May 10, 1979, pursuant to the passage
of the Support of Stepchildren statute by the legislature:
Effective May 31, 1979, your financial
and medical stepchild assistance case will
be discontinued.
The reason for this
closure is because of a change in the Utah
law which becomes effective May 3, 19 7 9.
(Vol. II, Sec. 232)
You may be eligible for other types of
assistance including Food Stamps, Medical
Assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children for the entire family, or restricted
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state stepchild program.
If you wish
to apply for any of these programs,
contact your local Assistance Payments
Office at 2835 South Main PO Box 15729,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, Phone 5825200.
A fair hearing request will not be
granted unless you feel the reason
for the closure action was for other
than the change in state law.
If you have any questions regarding
this notice, please contact the office
listed above.
Although simple and straight forward, this notice
met each of the requirements of the regulations.

First, it

states the intended action, discontinuance of financial and
medical stepchild assistance, and second, gives the reason-the change in the Utah law.

Third, the specific change in

the law is cited, Volume II, section 232 of the Financial
Assistance Regulations of the Assistance Payments Administration.
The fourth of the provisions requires "a statement
of the circumstances under which a hearing may be obtained
and assistance continued."

(Emphasis supplied.)

The "and"

suggests that both the hearing and continuing assistance are
necessary, and a hearing which does not lead to continuing
assistance would not need to be mentioned in the notice.
45 C.F.R.

§

205.lO(a) (5) states:

An opportunity for a hearing shall
be granted. to any applicant who requests
a hearing because his or her claim for
financial assistance ... or medical
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assistance is denied, or is not acted
upon with reasonable promptness, and to
any recipient who is aggrieved by any
agency action resulting in suspension,
reduction, discontinuance, or termination
of assistance. A hearing need not be
granted when either State or Federal
law require automatic grant adjustments
for classes of recipients unless the
reason for an individual appeal is
incorrect grant computation.
The only exception to the rule that hearings are
not required is when there is an appeal in the case of an
incorrect grant computation. This subsection also sheds
light on the fourth provision of 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(4) (iii).
For a hearing leading to continued assistance, there must
have been an incorrect grant computation.

The next to

last sentence of the May 10 notice sent by the Assistance
Payments Administration states, "[a] fair hearing request

u~

will not be granted unless you feel the reason for the

t

closure action was for other than the change in state law."

~

re

This is just what the federal regulations provide - no
hearing unless for an incorrect grant computation.
4 5 C. F. R. 2 0 5. 10 (a) ( 6) states :
If the recipient requests a hearing
within the timely notice period:
(i) Assistance shall not be suspended,
reduced, discontinued or terminated,
until a decision is rendered after a
hearing, unless:
(A) A determination is made at the
hearing that the sole issue is one of
State or Federal law and not one of
incorrect grant computation;
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Both (a) (5) and (a) (6) predicate the holding of a hearing
on a request for a hearing by the welfare recipient.

And

yet, appellants have never met even this fundamental
threshhold requirement for a hearing.
The failure to bring this case under the federal
provisions should block further consideration of appellants 1
claims.
Appellants rely on Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F.Supp.
546 (E.D. Pa. 1978), a case which involved widespread cheating
and abuse of a state orthopedic shoe program.

Pennsylvania

understandably wished to terminate the program which was
optional under federal regulations, but lost its case in
federal district court.

Appellants cite the case for the

contention that failure to comply with federal regulations
requires a reinstatement of the terminated program.

However,

the case is distinguishable from the present matter.

First,

the only notice given of the termination of the Pennsylvania
program was in a news circular; no notice of termination was
sent to any of the welfare recipients.

The court does not

state that a timely request for a hearing is not still
necessary under its decision, provided adequate notice is
given.

In that case, of course, no such hearing request

was possible since no notice was given initially.

In the case

at hand, however, timely notice was sent, and appellants failed
-22-
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to make the necessary hearing request.
Appellants cite Curtis v. Page, No. 78-732 (N.D.
Fla. Apr. 13, 1978, Appendix 4 of Appellants' brief), for
the proposition that a failure to specifically state the
change in the law renders a state's notice inadequate.

No

reference to any change in the law was made in the notice
in that case.

Utah's notice, on the contrary, does state

the specific change in the law, as discussed above.
·

.in~

There is nothing in the apparently complete and
self-contained statement of 45 C.F.R. § 205.lO(a) (5) indicates
to the state administrator attempting to deal with the complex
and murky federal regulations that (5) might be modified by
45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (6) and that he must read further before
drawing up his state's notice of termination or reduction.
At least one court has criticized 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (6) for
its ambiguity.

Budnicki v. Beal, supra, at 553.

Although

•I

la

!S

respondents maintain that they have substantially complied
with the federal regulations, if ·some mistake was made,
there was certainly a good faith

attempt to follow the

provisions.
Both Turner v. Walsh, 535 F.Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo.,
1977), and Viverito v. Smith, 421 F.Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
also cited by appellants, indicate that in the final analysis,
a court's remedy for any failure to comply with the federal
requirements necessitates a weighing of the equities involved
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in each case.

Certainly in the case before the court,

involving as it does, over two million dollars in retroactive payments alone, not to mention the substantial
expense, time, and difficulty in reopening the 1800 cases
involved, and its threat to the fundamental doctrine of
leaving appropriations questions to the legislative branch,
should weigh heavily against the remedy appellants seek.
In all the C.F.R. provisions discussed herein, the
common theme of notice and hearing presupposes "agency action,"
a term used in 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.lO(a) (4) (iii), 205.lO{a) (5),
and 205.lO(a) (6).

The underlying difficulty is that the

agency was simply implementing a recent legislative enactment.
No benefits were terminated because of "agency action."
Rather they were terminated because of legislative action.

To

grant fair hearings on the issue of wether stepparent assistance
should have been terminated for these plaintiffs would be to
set the hearing decision-maker above the legislature, a result
that clearly makes no sense in our system.
If the court should remand the case for new notice
by the Assistance Payments Administration, even that action
would be of little help to appellants, who would still need
an appropriation from the legislature in order to receive any
benefits.

This illustrates the reason that no hearings were

held by the agency in the first place - there was no real
alternative to the action taken.
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POINT III
DEFENDANTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED
WITH ALL APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE
UTAH RULE-MAKING ACT.
Appellants claim that respondents failed to comply
with the procedures of the Utah Rule-Making Act (Utah Code
Annotated, Section 63-46-1, et seq.) in terminating assistance
to the stepchildren.

Appellants have not shown any authority

supporting their claim that the conditions and circumstances
.on,'

faced by the respondents did not justify use of the emergency

procedure.

An examination of the relevant provisions

of the Code is in order here.
(1)
Prior to the adoption, amendment,
or repeal of any rule, the agency shall:
(a)
Give notice of its intended action.
This notice shall include a statement of
either the terms or substance of the intended
action or a description of the subjects
and issues involved, the reasons for the
proposed rule, and the time when, the place
where, and the manner in which interested
persons may present their views regarding
it.
The notice shall be mailed to all
persons who have made timely request of
the agency for advance notice of its
rule-making proceedings and shall be
published in the bulletin to be published
by the state archivist as provided in
section 63-46-7.
The state archivist
shall maintain for notice of rule making
a list of names and addresses of persons
who request mailed notice of agency rule
making as required by this act.
Except
as provided in subsection (2), (3), and
(4) of this section, no action shall be
taken by the agency until at least twenty
days have elapsed following such mailing
and publication of this notice.
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(b) Afford all interested persons
reasonable opportunity to participate in
rule making by submitting data, views,
or arguments, either orally or in writing,
as determined by the agency.
In the case
of substantive rules 1 an opportunity for
oral hearing must be granted if requested
by 25 persons, by a governmental subdivision or an agency, or by an association
having not less than 25 members if requests
are made in writing within fifteen days
after the mailing and publication of the
last notice of rule making. Upon adoption
of a rule, the agency, if requested to do
so by an interested person either prior
to adoption or within thirty days thereafter, shall issue a concise written
statement of the principal reasons for
and against its adoption, incorporating
in this statement its reasons for overruling the considerations urged against
its adoption.
(2)
If an agency finds that an imminent
peril to the public health, safety, or
welfare requires adoption of a rule without
providing the notice required by subsection
(1) of this section and states in writing
its reasons for that finding, it may proceed
without prior notice or hearing, or upon
any abbreviated notice and hearing that it
finds practicable, to adopt an emergency
rule.
The rule may be effective for a
period of not longer than 120 days, but
the adoption of an identical rule under
subsection (1) of this section is not
precluded.
(3)
If an agency finds that any of the
rule-making procedures required by this
section are impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest with
respect to the adoption and filing of a
particular rule or a particular designated
type or class of rules, it may, to the
minimum extent require by that finding,
proceed without compliance with this section
to adopt and file such rule or rules, if
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the agency adopts and files with the rule
or rules a written statement of findings
and reasons for such action which shall
be published in the bulletin along with
the rule or rules.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46-5.
There is no authority holding that the severe
budgetary limitations experienced by respondents as a result
of legislative decisions did not justify resort to the
emergency provisions outlined in Utah Code Annotated, Section
63-46-5(2) as

cont~ined

above.

The difficulty in appellants'

position becomes apparent upon the realization that following
the rule-making procedure would be a useless exercise and a
waste of agency funds and time unless such action could have
changed the result.

If the agency involved had the power to

continue the assistance to the stepchildren, the effect would
be to give the agency through its rule-making process, primacy·
over the legislative process.

The obligation of the agency

is to follow the statutes and guidelines of the legislature.
The power of the purse is an inherent power of the legislative
branch, and the legislative power is vested in the House of
Representatives and Senate, Utah Constitution, Article VI,
Section 1(1), and no person charged with responsibilities of
onebranchof government shall exercise functions appertaining
to the others.

Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1.

The Utah Budgetary Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section
63-38-1 et seq., outlines the procedures to be followed in
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the budgetary process.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-38-1

(2) provides:
In providing that certain appropriations
are to be expended in accordance with a
schedule or other restriction, ... it is
the intent of the legislature to limit
thereby the amount of money to be expended
from each such appropriations item for
certain specified purposes. Each such
schedule shall be a restriction or
limitation upon the expenditure of the
respective appropriation made, ....
The intent of the Utah Constitution and the Budgetary
Procedures Act is to clearly delineate the powers of government
and to carefully prevent improper expenditures.

The result

pressed for by appellants is illogical, upsets the procedures
of government, and should not be entertained by this Court.
The rule-making process in this instance served the sole
purpose of translating the legislative mandate of Senate
Bill 54 and its related budget cuts into the format of the
Department's eligibility manual.
Even had the Department started earlier with its
rule-making process and gone through the regular procedure
rather than the emergency procedure, the result was still a
foregone conclusion because the legislature had cut off the
funds for the program at issue.
The rule-making process offered no potential
restoration of the several million dollar appropriation
which the legislature had deleted for stepchild assistance.
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Without the appropriation the executive officials were
powerless to maintain the program.

But, even through the

emergency rule-making process there was an opportunity for
the plaintiffs to register their views.

There has

been no indication whatsoever that the named plaintiffs or
any potential member of the plaintiff class attempted to
exercise any prerogatives in the rule-making process at
the time the new rule was announced in the rule-making
etar;

bulletin of May 1.

Plaintiffs did not even file this

lawsuit until the 31st of May, 1979, which raised a serious
question as to the timeliness of their request in seeking
relief against the initial implementation of the rulemaking.

Any injunctive relief invalidating the rule-making

process would be equitable in nature, but plaintiffs simply
did not file a timely action for this kind of equitable relief.
The actual process of terminating the stepchild assistance
program was substantially completed long before the 31st of
May.

Issuing checks for the month of June was a process

that would have required several weeks of preparation.

It

could not have been done overnight as plaintiffs seem to
believe.
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POINT IV
THIS COURT LACKS THE POWER TO COMPEL A
STATE AGENCY TO FUND A PROGRAM RETROACTIVELY.
If the Court grants the retroactive benefits that
appellants seek, it will in effect be making a new budgetary
appropriation in clear contravention of the intent of the
legislature in passing the Support of Stepchildren Act.
Senator Kay

s.

Cornaby, who was the sponsor of Senate

Bill 54, indicated in his floor discussion of the statute
just before it was passed overwhelmingly in the Senate and
later by the House, that the intent of the measure was
to reduce unnecessary expenditures to those who don't really
need the money to support their stepchildren.

Citing the

fact that the statute was designed to prevent the abuse of
public tax funds by awarding it to parents whose income was
already adequate, Senator Cornaby stated that the bill would
save an estimated two million dollars in state funds and four
and a half million dollars in federal appropriations.

He

concluded by saying, "We ought to be able to save that money,
especially in this era of concern about excessive expenditures
in state government."
January 17, 1979.)

(Utah State Senate Floor Discussion,

The tenor of the remarks by Representative

LaMont Richards in House discussion is very similar and
evidences~concern

that many parents whose incomes were in

the middle to upper middle ranges were receiving funds in
violation of the intent of the stepchildren support program.
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See Utah House of Representatives Floor Discussion# February
6, 1979.

The power of appropriation is one of the fundamental
powers delegated to the legislature.

By its very nature it

involves balancing of competing political considerations and
is therefore inherently a job for elected representatives.
This budgetary power includes not only the right to appropriate,
but the right not to appropriate for a given program.

If the

money necessary to achieve the result desired by appellants
is awarded, then less money will be available for the needs
ly

.which the legislature found more pressing.

It is not within

the province of the court to determine the relative merits
of different spending proposals, especially when not all the
information necessary for such a decision is before the Court.

~d

In this case, the legislature expressly refused to grant the

~

money.

iy,

re)

1

~

The Utah Constitution, in Article V, Section 1 provides

that there

is to be no such overstepping of bounds by members

of the different branches of the state government.
As James Bryce said in comments on the structure
of the federal government, but which are equally apropos here:
"There remains the power which in free countries has long been
regarded as the citadel of parlimentary supremacy, the power
of the purse.

Congress has the sole right of raising money

and appropriating it to the service of the state."

The

American Conunonwealth, 158 (1905).
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It is not proper to permit those who have lost a
legislative battle to hurry into court to require the
extensive expenditure of money which they couldn't get in
the proper forum in the first place.

Granting the remedy

appellants seek in effect gives the Court power that not
even the Governor has; the Governor may reject an entire
act of the

legislat~re,

but even he, with his powers to

propose the budget, cannot turn a non-appropriation into an
appropriation.

See the Budgetary Procedures Act, Utah Code

Annotated, Sections 63-38-1 et seq.

The power of the purse

is one of the most basic prerogatives given to the legislative
branch, and concerns all of the legislature's deliberations.
The framers of our system of government never intended the
legislative bodies to become mere

bookkeepers~for

the courts.

In his discussion of the proper role of the judiciary,
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist Paper No. 78,

"The

judiciary has no influence over the sword or the purse; no
·direction either of the strength.or the wealth of the society;
and can take no active resolution whatever."
Merely by way of example of the difficulty inherent
in a proposed fiscal appropriation by the judiciary, in
Lovett v. U.S., 66 F.Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl., 1945), the court
ruled that, although three individuals had a right to be
paid for their federal employment,

(in the light of a

congressional appropriations measure providing that government
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employees not be paid their salaries unless Congress
confirmed their continued employment) it could not order
Congress to appropriate or the Treasury to pay the money.
No money was paid the employees, deserving though they were,
until the House finally passed a bill awarding them their
salaries.
CONCLUSION
The Support of Stepchildren Act complies substantially
with the Social Security Act and federal regulations and was
properly used to terminate welfare benefits to appellants.
ive

5,

ty;

As the correspondence between respondents and the regional
commissioner for the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare indicates, Utah has done everything in its power to
comply with the federal regulations.

The act, as amended

in the most recent legislative session, has received no
further objection from H.E.W.
The implementation of the act also substantially
complied with the federal notice .and hearing provisions and
with the Utah Administrative Procedure Act.
The analysis and remedy suggested by appellants is

nt

impractical and violates fundamental state constitutional
doctrines.

The proper remedy in the matter, if any was

necessary, was for H.E.W. to take.

It has seen fit to take
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no action.

Respondents respectfully submit that the most

judicious course for this Court to follow is to affirm
the considered opinion of the district court.
Dated this 12th day of June, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
PAUL M. TINKER
SHARON PEACOCK
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Respondents
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OF AHGR~~EY GENERAL

Dear Dr. Mitchell:

This is to confirm a telephone conversation bet¥een Mr. Keith Oram
and Ms. Barbara Costa, held on November 7; 1979. The subject of that
conversation was revisions proposed to be made to Utah Senate Bill 54,
"Support of Stepchildren. 11

Mr. Oram had earlier requested regional office's opinion on whether the
original language contained in Section 78-45-4.2 could be retained. In
a letter dated October 26, 1979, Mr. Oram had transmitted a copy of
proposed revisions for Senate Bill 54, designed to overcome previous
HEW objections to the "Support of Stepchildren" law.

One of the proposed

revisions was the deletion of Section 78-45-4.2.
The regional office response was that Section 78-45-4.2 could be retained
in its original language. In correspondence dated August 3, 1979, the
. regional office had deleted previous objections to that section and the
present position of the regional office remains the same. This is based
upon our analysis which concluded that the stepparent's right to reimbursement from a natural/adoptive parent does not lessen his obligation
to support his stepchild.Ten as otherwise provided for under Utah law.
Please be advised that this correspondence relates only to the regional
office's position on Section 78-45-4.2 and that our analysis of the
remainder of Senate Bill 54 has not yet been completed. We ~'ill advise
you as soon as that process has been completed and at that time, ~ii.11
provide you "With our position on the total bill.

7

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely,

~c~
Leza Gooden

l;z.--~

Assistant Regional Commissioner
Family Assistance cc· K'2.f t/I\.~
cc:

::::::::::::::::.

Associate Commissioner for Family Assistance
Central Office
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact
copies of the Brief of Respondents, postage prepaid, to
Bruce Plenk, Utah Legal Services, Inc., Attorneys for
Appellants, at 352 South Denver Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84111, on this the 12th day of June, 1980.
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